Applying Bayesian reasoning to enhance diagnostic precision in the Emergency Department

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ABSTRACT
Emergency medicine demands prompt, decisive actions, often contingent on diagnostic tests. However, the reliance on diagnostic tests, despite their ostensible precision, can sometimes lead to suboptimal outcomes. This paper delves into three clinical scenarios that highlight the importance of a judicious, Bayesian approach in medical practice. The first scenario focuses on a patient with chest pain and a low pre-test probability of pulmonary embolism but a positive imaging result. The second scenario addresses the misleading absence of ST-segment elevation on the electrocardiogram, providing a false negative result of myocardial infarction. The third clinical scenario involves a patient with wide QRS tachycardia. The scenarios underscore that while diagnostic tests are instrumental, they should not eclipse clinical judgment. The overreliance on diagnostics can lead to misdiagnoses, therapeutic failure and/or inadequate treatment of the patient. In the era of evidence-based medicine, the amalgamation of clinical experience, current evidence, and patient values is paramount. This discourse advocates blending clinician intuition with probabilistic reasoning, thereby optimizing decision-making and enhancing patient welfare. Emergency practitioners are urged to harness both their experiential acumen and the Bayesian approach to achieve the best patient outcomes.

Keywords: Emergency medicine; Clinical reasoning; Sensitivity and specificity; Hospital emergency service
INTRODUCTION
In the fast-paced realm of emergency medicine, diagnostic precision is paramount. Clinicians frequently encounter scenarios where they must assess the probabilities associated with diagnostic tests, a skill crucial to making informed decisions under pressure. Sensitivity and specificity have traditionally been hailed as the gold standards for evaluating diagnostic tests. However, in the day-to-day clinical setting, especially within an emergency room’s confines, these metrics may not provide a holistic view. These metrics often arise from studies where patient outcomes are predefined, contrasting starkly with real-world situations where the medical trajectory is yet to unfold. Such a discrepancy highlights the potential pitfalls of relying solely on these measures and underscores the necessity for more sophisticated diagnostic tools.

Bayesian reasoning offers a promising solution. In the context of emergency medicine, it provides a methodological framework that integrates initial probabilities sourced from either broad epidemiological data or individual patient presentations into the diagnostic process. Such an approach not only offers a more granular understanding of a patient’s condition but also fosters enhanced patient-centric decisions. This narrative review delved into articles on Pubmed®, spanning all publication dates, to gather insights on Bayesian reasoning’s role in emergency medicine. Particularly, for the accuracy of the tests under discussion, the authors handpicked either the original articles or those whose methodologies closely mirrored the forthcoming clinical cases, ensuring a comprehensive examination of the topic.

As we navigate through this review, readers will be introduced to clinical scenarios, starting with a case of pulmonary embolism (PE) analyzed using an angiotomography. Subsequent cases will highlight the nuanced interpretation of electrocardiograms (ECGs), shedding light on the multifaceted applications of Bayesian reasoning in emergency diagnostics.

CLINICAL SCENARIO 1: TRADITIONAL APPROACH
A patient presents to the Emergency Department complaining of chest pain. Clinical evaluation reveals that the pain is distinctly muscular in nature, worsening upon gentle palpation at a specific thoracic site and not modulated by respiratory movements. Notably, the patient’s medical history is devoid of any prior event of venous thrombosis, surgical intervention, or episodes of prolonged immobilization, and a thorough physical examination unremarkable. However, influenced by a preceding encounter where an asymptomatic patient was found to have a pulmonary arterial thrombus on tomography, the current attending physician, perhaps exhibiting anchoring effect, elects to perform a computed tomography pulmonary angiography (CTPA) for all subsequent patients presenting with chest pain. The imaging results for the current patient indicate the presence of a thrombus in one of the pulmonary arteries.

Given the reported sensitivity of the imaging modality at 94% (95% of confidence interval [95%CI] 0.89-0.97) and specificity at 98% (95%CI 0.97-0.99), the physician quickly reaches a diagnosis of PE in this patient. Yet, the reliance solely on these statistical values without considering the clinical context warrants scrutiny.

Sensitivity measures the true positive rate, indicating the probability of the test detecting the disease in affected individuals, while specificity calculates the true negative rate, showcasing the test’s ability to correctly identify healthy individuals. These are their formulas:

\[
\text{Sensitivity} = \frac{\text{True positives}}{\text{People with disease}}
\]

\[
\text{Specificity} = \frac{\text{True negatives}}{\text{Healthy individuals}}
\]

Translating these definitions to the present scenario raises pertinent questions: does the 94% sensitivity confirm that the patient has PE, or is the 98% specificity a better indicator of the disease’s presence? When relying on the sensitivity, how does one ascertain the presence of disease before
the test, given that the examination was intended to clarify this very uncertainty? Conversely, if one is persuaded by “SpIn and SnOut” mnemonic and uses the 98% specificity, the foundational question remains: how can we conclusively state the patient’s initial health status?

**WHY SENSITIVITY AND SPECIFICITY FAIL**

At the core of the issue lies the inherent retrospective nature of sensitivity and specificity. Defined by their ability to accurately identify individuals either with or without a disease, these metrics are invariably rooted in post-hoc data. They arise from situations where participants’ health statuses are pre-established, thus serving as a backward-looking measure. In contrast, the clinical realm operates primarily in a ‘pre-hoc’ domain.4,5 Here, medical professionals utilize diagnostic tools to discern the presence or absence of a disease when the outcome remains uncertain.

Consider the physician who is informed that a test boasts a sensitivity and specificity both pegged at 90%. Based on a positive result from this test, the immediate instinct might be to surmise a 90% likelihood of the patient suffering from the disease. However, this is a glaring fallacy. The disconnect stems from the foundational basis of sensitivity and specificity: they require prior knowledge of the health status of individuals. Conversely, in most clinical contexts, the very purpose of the test is to elucidate this unknown status. Neither the 90% sensitivity nor the 90% specificity, then, directly provides an accurate estimate of the disease’s probability in the patient.

The complexities of clinical scenarios extend beyond the parameters defined by sensitivity and specificity. Integral to informed decision-making are numerous factors, including a patient’s history, symptomatology, and findings from other diagnostic tests. Yet, sensitivity and specificity operate in isolation, devoid of this multi-dimensional clinical context.

This lacuna is further exacerbated by clinicians’ tendencies to favor intuitive reasoning, especially in routine problem-solving. This approach, while effective in some instances, can veer towards diagnostic errors due to its inherent lack of structure and analytical rigor.6 Another cognitive pitfall lies in the oversight of the diagnostic process’s probabilistic nature, leading to the phenomenon of base-rate neglect.7 By disproportionately emphasizing sensitivity and specificity, the clinician may inadvertently overlook the initial disease likelihood or its actual prevalence in a population segment. Such lapses impair the application of Bayesian reasoning and can culminate in skewed clinical judgments.

**UNDERSTANDING BAYESIAN REASONING**

Bayesian statistics stands as the logical underpinning for addressing the uncertainty inherent in decision-making structures. At its core, the essence of Bayesian reasoning is rather straightforward. In any decision-making scenario, there are quantities or outcomes that have been observed and documented, and there are those have not been, leading to inherent uncertainties. To make rational and informed decisions, it is imperative to quantify these uncertainties. This quantification is achieved through Bayesian statistics, which provides probability assessments by considering all relevant evidence derived from observed and recorded quantities and outcomes.8

The coherence of these probability statements is ensured by Bayes’ theorem, a foundational mathematical result. This theorem ensures that probability assessments, grounded in observed data, logically align, facilitating robust decision-making.

Transitioning to Bayesian reasoning signifies a shift from conventional thinking to a more dynamic, probabilistic approach. In the context of clinical decision making, besides making correct decisions, in daily clinical practice it is also important to make correct decisions quickly and this is supported by Bayesian reasoning.9 Rather than relying on black-and-white outcomes, Bayesian thought offers a spectrum of possibilities. It provides a gradient perspective, enabling an understanding of how
new information or diagnostic test results modify the pre-existing probability of a specific outcome.

This gradient view does more than just add depth to diagnostic thinking; it challenges medical professionals to tackle the often-neglected ambiguities that lurk within healthcare. By forcing them to address these ambiguities head-on, Bayesian reasoning prepares clinicians to make decisions that are not only informed but are also rooted in a deep understanding of the intricate interplay of probabilities.

Applying Bayesian reasoning in clinical practice demands an assortment of methodologies. One pivotal tool within the Bayesian framework is the concept of likelihood ratios. While these ratios find their roots in sensitivity and specificity, they provide a more vibrant interpretation of diagnostic outcomes. They shed light on how diagnostic tests recalibrate our estimation of a patient’s likelihood of having a specific condition. The strength of likelihood ratios is their capability to embed clinical assessments within the backdrop of prior probabilities or pre-test likelihoods, ensuring a clinician maintains a rounded view that integrates both inherent risks and new data from diagnostic results. From a mathematical viewpoint, the positive likelihood ratio (LR+) and the negative likelihood ratio (LR-) can be expressed as:

$$LR^+ = \frac{Sensitivity}{1 - Specificity}$$
$$LR^- = \frac{1 - Sensitivity}{Specificity}$$

Delving deeper into the essence of these ratios, they serve as pivotal indicators that empower medical practitioners in making informed decisions. When a physician contemplates ordering a diagnostic test, the aim is to identify which test, or combination of tests, can effectively confirm or refute the presence of a disease in a patient. Speaking the language of clinical epidemiology, physicians begin with an initial assessment of the disease likelihood, termed “pre-test probability”. Following the execution of the test, this initial probability undergoes a modification, culminating in a “post-test probability”. Figure 1 elucidates this transformational process of “revising the probability of disease”. Likelihood ratios play an instrumental role in indicating the extent of this shift in suspicion based on a specific test result. Given that tests can yield positive or negative results, each diagnostic test inherently carries two likelihood ratios. The LR+ guides us on the magnitude to amplify the disease probability upon obtaining a positive test, while the LR- provides insights into its necessary reduction if the result is negative.¹⁰

A practical interpretation of likelihood ratios is anchored in the following benchmarks: An LR >1 signifies an augmented probability that the target disorder exists. Conversely, an LR <1 suggests a diminished likelihood of the disorder’s presence. If the LR equals 1.0, the test result does not alter the disease’s probability in any way.

This understanding ushers in some illuminating revelations. A test with an LR+ near or equal to 1.0 does not contribute to the clinical reasoning for the patient, regardless of its sensitivity or specificity. For instance, in a hypothetical scenario a test boasting a specificity of 96% might seem impressive to an uninitiated mind, but a Bayesian thinker would probe into its sensitivity. If the sensitivity stands at a meager 4%, both the positive and LRs- hover around 1.0. This implies that a test, which on the surface appeared as a fantastic confirmatory tool, is, in mathematical terms, useless. Furthermore, considering that confidence intervals, by mathematical definition, vary to values lower and higher than those described in research, this variability could imply that a positive test might even argue against the presence of disease (in cases where the LR+ is less than 1.0, for example), or that a negative test could suggest the disease’s presence.

In essence, clinicians ought to reflect upon a fundamental query: By what factor do I amplify the chances of the individual having or not having the disease?
To practically utilize the concept of likelihood ratios in clinical reasoning, one might initially believe that merely multiplying the pre-test probability with the likelihood ratio would suffice. However, such an assumption is an oversimplification. In reality, it is not straightforward because likelihood ratios are odds ratios and not direct probability metrics.

To accurately determine the post-test probability, the pre-test probability must first be transformed into odds. Once in this format, the pre-test odds are then multiplied by the appropriate likelihood ratio, be it LR+ for a positive test or LR- for a negative one. This multiplication results in the post-test odds. But our journey does not end here. The final step involves converting these post-test odds back into a probability.

This calculation can be broken down into the following sequence:

1. Convert pre-test probability to odds:
   \[
   \text{Odds (pre-test)} = \frac{\text{Probability}}{1 - \text{Probability}}
   \]

2. Multiply by LR:
   \[
   \text{Odds (post-test)} = \text{Odds (pre-test)} \times LR
   \]

3. Convert post-test odds to probability:
   \[
   \text{Probability (post-test)} = \frac{\text{Odds (post-test)}}{1 + \text{Odds (post-test)}}
   \]

There are websites like http://getthediagnosis.org/calculator.htm that make this process a lot easier, by simply asking the user to input sensitivity and specificity or LR+ and LR- and pre-test probability.

Furthermore, the realm of Bayesian reasoning introduces the use of natural frequencies or what we call “Bayesian tree” (Figure 1). This approach calls for the drafting of a decision tree, initiated by...
gauging the probability of a disease in a particular patient or group. This structure is designed to elucidate how medical testing interacts with pre-existing probabilities to refine our understanding of a patient’s health status.\textsuperscript{11}

At the outset, there is the pre-test probability, which is a clinician’s initial estimation or the epidemiological likelihood of an individual having a disease before any tests are done. This estimation is based on various factors like patient history, clinical symptoms, and epidemiological data.

This tree then bifurcates into two primary branches: “diseased” and “healthy”. Each branch then further divides based on the results of the diagnostic test in question. Under “Diseased”, there are results that are true positives (correctly identified as having the disease) and false negatives (incorrectly identified as not having the disease despite being diseased). The “Healthy” side delineates into true negatives (correctly identified as not having the disease) and false positives (incorrectly identified as having the disease).

To refine our understanding further: If a test result is positive, the probability of genuinely having the disease is given by the proportion of True Positives among all positive results. If a test result is negative, the likelihood of still having the disease is defined by the proportion of False Negatives among all negative results.

Building on this, Fagan’s nomogram arises as a potent visual mechanism.\textsuperscript{12} This tool marries pre-test probabilities with likelihood ratios, paving the way to derive post-test probabilities (Figure 2). It is akin to having a visual companion accompanying a clinician through the Bayesian decision-making journey.

To bring the practical implications of Bayesian reasoning, the article will explore three hypothetical, yet common scenarios faced in emergency settings. The initial case will be re-examined, but this time under the Bayesian scope, followed by two subsequent cases.

**CLINICAL SCENARIO 1: UNBIASED (BAYESIAN APPROACH)**

Reviewing the clinical case of chest pain in an emergency setting, the imaging results of CTPA indicate the presence of a thrombus in one of the pulmonary arteries.

Before starting the analysis, it is important to highlight that diagnostic strategies for PE are based on evaluation of the pretest probability for each patient, which provides an estimate of the clinical probability of PE in a similar patient population. In this case, the pretest probability was determined by the Wells Score which results in a clinical classification with high, intermediate and low probability for PE.

Now that we are unbiased, we can opt for any of the three strategies delineated in the previous
section: likelihood ratio, natural frequencies, or Fagan’s nomogram. It is essential to understand that these approaches are different representations of the same Bayesian method, merely visualized in distinct ways, not separate methodologies. Regardless of the choice, the outcome remains consistent. For this case, let’s select the straightforward calculation method.

Considering our diagnostic test, it boasts a sensitivity of 94% and a specificity of 98%. With these values in mind, we will proceed to calculate the LR+ and LR-.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{LR+} &= \frac{\text{Sensitivity}}{(1 - \text{specificity})} = \frac{0.94}{(1 - 0.98)} = \frac{0.94}{0.02} = 47 \\
\text{LR-} &= \frac{(1 - \text{sensitivity})}{\text{specificity}} = \frac{(1 - 0.94)}{0.98} = \frac{0.06}{0.98} = 0.06
\end{align*}
\]

The derived likelihood ratios are notably good. Specifically, when such findings are present, the odds of someone having a pulmonary thromboembolism multiply approximately 47 times. This is a significant increase and, on its own, might be quite convincing.

However, taking a step back and considering the broader clinical picture is paramount. Our patient does not manifest a classic clinical picture for PE. Bearing this in mind, the clinician has deemed it prudent to assign a pre-test probability for PE of merely 1 in 100 or 1%. This pre-test probability, though low, serves as our foundation. With this 1% probability in hand and given that the test result was positive, we will now transition to calculating the post-test probability.

This becomes:

1. Odds (pre-test) = \( \frac{0.01}{(1-0.01)} = \frac{0.01}{0.99} = 0.01 \)

2. Odds (post-test) = 0.01 \times 47 = 0.47

3. Probability (post-test) = \( \frac{0.47}{(1+0.47)} = \frac{0.47}{1.47} = 0.31 \) or 31%

The computed post-test probability that this individual has a PE stands at 31%, whereas there’s a 69% chance they do not have the condition. It is imperative to underscore that a 31% likelihood is substantially lower than what the impressive sensitivity and specificity figures of 94% and 98% might initially suggest. Nonetheless, this shouldn’t be brushed aside.

The physician is now confronted with a patient who has a 31% chance of having pulmonary embolism, a potentially life-threatening ailment. This realization necessitates swift clinical judgment regarding further diagnostic tests or even the initiation of empirical treatment.

Moreover, it is worth mentioning that if upon closer observation, our patient exhibits any clinical signs consistent with PE, even those that might be considered “low-risk”, their classification could change. Starting with a low Wells score, for instance, their pre-test probability would rise to 1.3% to 2%.

**CLINICAL SCENARIO 2: CHEST PAIN WITHOUT ST SEGMENT ELEVATION**

A patient steps’ into the Emergency Department, describing a sensation of sternal pressure. A swift ECG reveals no signs of ST-segment elevation. It is tempting for a physician to view this absence as a clear indication, steering away from the likelihood of an acute coronary syndrome (ACS), more specifically non-ST elevation ACS (NSTE-ACS). Yet, this perspective overlooks the inherent probabilistic essence of medical practice. Diagnostic tools do not offer unequivocal answers; they shift the scales of likelihood.

Emerging findings in the medical literature are shedding light on the precision of ST-segment elevation as a diagnostic marker for acute coronary occlusion. A pivotal study highlighted that the presence of ST-segment elevation carries a sensitivity of 41%, a specificity of 94% and accuracy of 77% when pinpointing occlusion myocardial infarction. To a physician not considering the probability of false-negative outcomes, the absence of ST-segment elevation might give the impression of a definitive absence of coronary occlusion. Such a perspective is a reductionist take on the situation.
To navigate this with more depth, we can lean into the Bayesian framework. By infusing the initial pre-test probability – which we estimated at 80% for an acute coronary occlusion, given the patient’s presentation and risk profile – we can delve deeper. For this exercise, let us adopt the method of natural frequencies (though I must emphasize, choosing another methodology would lead us to the same conclusion). Crafting a Bayesian tree with these inputs nudges us toward a post-test probability of 71.5% that an infarction is underway, even without visible ST-segment elevation (Figure 3).

Besides clinical presentation and ECG criteria, biomarkers play a complementary role in the diagnosis, risk stratification, and management of patients with suspected ACS. One of these biomarkers is the cardiac troponin, whether the high-sensitivity or conventional, which rises rapidly in patients with myocardial infarction and remain elevated for a variable period of time. Despite significant advances in the sensitivity of cardiac troponin tests, more than one in four patients with ST segment elevation myocardial infarction have troponin concentrations below the European Society of Cardiology (ESC) recommended threshold at presentation. This limitation of troponin dosage occurs because during myocardial infarction, abrupt coronary occlusion can prevent the release of troponin into the circulation until reperfusion is performed. Moreover, troponin does not show the etiology nor distinguish myocardial injury from acute myocardial infarction (AMI). While troponin levels do not alter the revascularization approach in cases of coronary occlusion, its role becomes crucial in instances of false-negative ECGs. In such cases, troponin testing may be the next step and can also present false-negative results in very early acute coronary occlusions still within the optimal timeframe for reperfusion (door-to-needle and door-to-balloon).

**CLINICAL SCENARIO 3: WIDE QRS TACHYCARDIA WITH NEGATIVE ELECTROCARDIOGRAM CRITERIA**

Imagine a patient with history of ischemic cardiac conditions arriving at the Emergency Department with a wide QRS complex tachycardia. Even with recognized guidelines recommending prompt intervention, the attending physician chooses to distinguish between ventricular tachycardia (VT) and supraventricular tachycardia (SVT) by

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**Figure 3.** Bayesian analysis of the probability assessment for acute myocardial infarction in the presence of a non-elevated ST-segment. The diagram starts with a pre-test probability of 80% based on the patient’s clinical presentation. It then splits into “Diseased” and “Healthy” branches, further dissecting the outcomes using the sensitivity and specificity values. The end result showcases the proportions of true positives, false negatives, false positives, and true negatives. The side calculation details the derivation of the false negative proportion, emphasizing its significance in the context of the presented clinical scenario.
Bayesian reasoning in the Emergency Department

employing the Vereckei parameters. The ECG does not show an initial r wave in aVR, the duration of the initial q wave does not exceed 40 ms, and the Vi/Vt ratio in aVR indicates SVT rather than VT, leading to treatment based on the latter diagnosis.

Yet, this assessment overlooks the probabilistic nature inherent in medical practice. Each electrocardiographic indicator has its respective LR- for VT: 0.68 without an initial r wave in aVR, 0.73 when the initial q wave does not exceed 40 ms, and 0.60 when the Vi/Vt ratio in aVR signals against VT. In unison, the aggregated LR- for the Vereckei parameters stands at 0.29. To deduce this, we will directly employ the Fagan's nomogram (Figure 4), using 90% as pre-test probability based on patient’s history. This leads to the inference that there is a 72% likelihood of the patient experiencing VT, even when all indicators are negative. This underscores the potential risk of a patient receiving suboptimal care if the most plausible diagnosis is prematurely ruled out.

That is the reason why the ability to differentiate between VT and SVT using ECG criteria may not be as clinically impactful as traditionally believed. Relying solely on these criteria can lead to misdiagnoses and may not significantly alter immediate clinical management. It is essential to follow emergency arrhythmia guidelines and to consult with an electrophysiologist for a comprehensive evaluation post-stabilization.

EMBRACING UNCERTAINTY: LIMITATIONS OF BAYESIAN REASONING

Embracing uncertainty in medicine is a challenging endeavor. The Bayesian approach may initially appear overly idealistic in practice. Despite physicians’ awareness of uncertainty, there is a reluctance within medical culture to openly recognize and deal with it. Our educational systems, clinical case discussions, and research paradigms are built on the conviction that we must distill a wide array of symptoms, signs, and test results into a conclusive diagnosis. We are often compelled to formulate a definitive differential diagnosis with limited information and encourage our trainees to commit to a decision, disregarding the profound impact cognitive biases might have under these circumstances. Regularly, the goal shifts towards converting the patient’s complex story into a simplistic, definitive diagnosis that fits neatly into established categories. This tendency risks diminishing the intricate and evolutionary nature of clinical reasoning and, at the same time, stands in contrast to the very ideals of personalized, patient-centric care.

In the realm of contemporary medicine, the tendency is to sidestep or outright ignore uncertainty, both knowingly and unknowingly. This avoidance is somewhat understandable; uncertainty introduces a feeling of vulnerability,
an apprehension about the unknown that’s deeply unsettling. It propels us towards seeking certainty, to find solace in the black-and-white, away from the uncomfortable, ambiguous grays. Our medical protocols and guidelines often prioritize clear-cut, binary outcomes, further perpetuating this desire for certainty. Physicians might also harbor concerns that voicing uncertainty could be perceived as a lack of knowledge by patients and colleagues, prompting them to conceal their doubts. This attitude is largely influenced by a tradition of rationalism that promises a false sense of security and definitive understanding.\textsuperscript{21}

However, the inherent uncertainties of life and medicine inherently limit the Bayesian method. Physicians will not always have pre-test probabilities readily available from previous studies, and even when they do, those probabilities might have been skewed due to patient selection bias or may not perfectly match the patient’s specific situation, leaving only extrapolation as an option. Similarly, the application of tests is not immune to biases such as patient selection, incorporation bias, or spectrum bias, which can all skew the outcomes of research determining the likelihood ratios used in calculations. The uncertainty in Bayesian reasoning reflects the uncertainty in medicine itself.

For medical professionals, it is vital to see uncertainty not as an obstacle but as an essential aspect of clinical practice. Recognizing and accepting this uncertainty is key to delivering care that is tailored to each patient’s specific needs and circumstances. By being mindful of the inherent unpredictabilities in medicine, clinicians can make more considered and individualized decisions. This approach enhances the quality of care provided and builds a foundation of trust and openness between the patient and healthcare provider.

CONCLUSION

In the intricate and demanding environment of emergency medicine, clinicians are often called upon to make swift and critical decisions, many of which are grounded in diagnostic testing. The clinical scenarios presented in this article underscore the profound significance of adopting a judicious, Bayesian approach, integrating both clinical acumen and diagnostic data. The era of evidence-based medicine in which we find ourselves champions the amalgamation of clinical experience with current evidence and patient values. However, the propensity to over-rely on diagnostic tests, often perceived as the infallible arbiters of disease, can be a slippery slope.

Our clinical scenarios elucidate the fallibility that can emerge when diagnostic tests are perceived through an overly deterministic lens. Relying blindly on diagnostics, be it due to their impressive sensitivity and specificity or established guidelines, can lead to both false positives and false negatives. Such misdiagnoses have palpable ramifications, jeopardizing patient outcomes.

Emergency practitioners are adept at navigating the labyrinth of differential diagnoses, often relying on intuition sharpened by years of experience. However, the key takeaway from this discourse is the indispensable nature of blending that intuition with a probabilistic reasoning approach. Such an approach guards against the potential pitfalls of over-trusting or underestimating diagnostic tools. As healthcare professionals, our primary mandate is the welfare and safety of our patients. By embracing a rational, Bayesian mindset and understanding the inherent limitations and strengths of our diagnostic arsenal, we can hone our decision-making process and further that mandate.

REFERENCES